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Recent work in the area of interdependent networks has focused on interactions
between two systems of the same type. However, an important and ubiquitous class
of systems are those involving monitoring and control, an example of interdependence
between processes that are very different. In this Article, we introduce a framework
for modelling ‘distributed supervisory control’ in the guise of an electrical network
supervised by a distributed system of control devices. The system is characterised
by degrees of freedom salient to real-world systems— namely, the number of control
devices, their inherent reliability, and the topology of the control network. Surprisingly,
the behavior of the system depends crucially on the reliability of control devices. When
devices are completely reliable, cascade sizes are percolation controlled; the number
of devices being the relevant parameter. For unreliable devices, the topology of the
control network is important and can dramatically reduce the resilience of the system.
The study of interdependent, networked, systems is an
area that has recently received a lot of attention [1–11],
where the majority of work has so far focussed on the in-
teractions between different ‘critical infrastructures’ [12–
16]. We argue that critical infrastructures should them-
selves be viewed as a special class of interdependent sys-
tems, due to the presence of in-built monitoring and
control mechanisms [12, 17, 18]. The type of control
most prevalent in such systems is so-called ‘supervisory’
control— as distinguished from, say, controllability [19]—
which typically involves monitoring an underlying pro-
cess, with the option of a pre-defined intervention once a
critical state is reached. Here, in keeping with the picture
of interdependent networks, both monitoring and inter-
vention are local processes, associated with specific points
on the underlying network. Furthermore, we are inter-
ested in the case when the control is ‘distributed’, that
is the local interventions are somehow coordinated via
communications between sensors. At the most general
level, we are interested in building a physics-like model
of such systems: that is, complicated enough to encom-
pass any interesting behaviour, but sufficiently idealized
that the mechanisms at play can be easily identified and
understood.
Our ideas are based on the supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) concept, ubiquitous in real-
world monitoring of industrial manufacturing, power gen-
eration, and distribution processes (e.g., electricity, gas,
and water) [20]. To this end, our model comprises an
underlying system, here, an electrical network, where a
simple control device is placed on each transmission line
with a probability p (see Fig. 1). The device monitors
the load of that line and, if it is overloaded, then the
device can dissipate the excess load with a probability
of success q, and prevent the failure. In the opposite
case, the line fails and the load is redistributed. The re-
distribution of loads may then lead to the overloading
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and failure of further power lines, and so on, potentially
resulting in large system-wide outages [21]. If, at any
stage during this process, more than one line becomes
overloaded, then it is assumed that the next line to fail
will be the one with the largest excess load. In the case
where these lines are supervised, it therefore helps if the
control devices respond in a coordinated way— always
dissipating the excess load on the line under the greatest
threat of failure. We therefore stipulate that for a con-
trol device to be operational, it must be in contact with a
central processing unit (CPU). We envisage a communi-
cation network composed of ICT-like links connecting the
devices and the CPU where, in keeping with a distributed
SCADA picture, each device can also act as a signal
relay— so called ‘daisy chaining’. Crucially, this means
that when a control device fails, it can disconnect many
other devices from the CPU, rendering them useless—
and dramatically increasing the fragility of the system.
The structure of the supervisory network is therefore very
important, and we consider two extremes. On one hand,
a Euclidean minimum spanning tree (EMST) minimises
the total length of the control network— and hence the
cost— but typically sacrifices direct connectivity to the
CPU. On the other hand, a mono-centric network max-
imises direct connectivity to the CPU, but can be very
costly in terms of the total length of network needed.
We interpolate between these two configurations by us-
ing a simple rewiring process: for each node in a EMST,
replace with probability µ, the edge connected to the
neighbor closest to the CPU (along the network), by an
edge that connects directly to the CPU. The result is
that the topology of the supervisory network relies on
one continuous parameter µ ∈ [0, 1], such that µ = 0 and
µ = 1 correspond to EMST and mono-centric networks
respectively.
For modelling the electrical network we adopt a
straightforward approach which has been proposed and
analysed elsewhere [22]. The idea assumes a set of pro-
ducers and consumers linked by power lines, where the
resulting load carried by each line, or edge, may be rep-
resented by a random variable drawn from a uniform dis-
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FIG. 1: Supervisory control. a: The underlying power grid is represented by blue nodes and black edges. The load carried
by power-lines (edges) is supervised by control devices, shown by red squares. The control devices act as signal relays and form
a supervisory network (red edges) with the CPU. b: For a given overloaded edge, there is a probability p that a control device
is present. If this device is connected to the CPU, then it can be determined if the edge is carrying the largest excess load in
the system. If so, the device will attempt to dissipate the excess load, with a success rate q.
tribution U . Since U is properly normalized, the upper
and lower bounds of the distribution are related to the
average load l¯, such that
U(l¯) =
{
1/2l¯ ∀ l ∈ [0, 2l¯] if l¯ ≤ 1/2
1/2
(
1− l¯) ∀ l ∈ [2l¯ − 1, 1] if l¯ > 1/2 . (1)
In keeping with the above, it is also assumed that the
transmission lines have an intrinsic carrying capacity (as-
sumed here, without loss of generality, to be one) which,
if exceeded, causes the line to fail and the load to be redis-
tributed evenly amongst its nearest neighbours [23]. The
crucial departure from Ref. [22], is in our choice of net-
work topology. Since many critical infrastructures are,
to a good approximation, planar subdivisions [24], we
use the well known Delaunay triangulation [25], which is
a simple, reasonable model for planar networks such as
power grids.
Results
We test the vulnerability of our model against fail-
ure cascades by using computer simulations (see Methods
section for details). For given values of the parameters
p, q, µ, and l, we repeatedly generate instances of the
ensemble, each time initiating a cascade according to a
‘fallen tree’ approach— that is, an unspecified external
event removes an edge and, if it is supervised, the asso-
ciated control device. Following each cascade, Nlcc, the
size of the remaining largest connected component of the
underlying electricity network, is recorded. We assume
that administrators / designers of real systems are inter-
ested in ensuring that cascades are bounded by a certain
size. To this end, we consider
Pε = P (1−Nlcc/N ≤ ε) , (2)
the probability that, following a cascade, the num-
ber of nodes disconnected from the largest connected
component— the effective cascade ‘size’: 1−Nlcc/N— is
less than a fraction ε ∈ (0, 1] of the original nodes.
In general, as one would expect, the larger the average
load carried by the system, the smaller the probability
that the cascade size is bounded (see Fig. 2a). However,
we also observe another feature of this type of cascading
model, first identified in Ref. [22]: for each value of p,
there is a non-zero critical value
lε = sup
{
l ∈ (0, 1) : Pε
(
l
)
= 1
}
, (3)
that corresponds to the maximum average load below
which cascade sizes are bounded with probability one
(within a given accuracy, here 1 part in 5×103). Plotting
the values of l1/2 against p, a sharp transition can be ob-
served at some point p∗ (see Fig. 2b). Above this value,
the fraction of disconnected nodes is always bounded by
ε = 1/2, regardless of how much load the system is carry-
ing. In the completely reliable case (q = 1), p∗ just corre-
sponds to the percolation threshold pc (∼ 0.33 for Delau-
nay triangulations [26]). The cascades are then ‘percola-
tion controlled’ due to the formation of a giant compo-
nent connected by supervised edges, coined here the giant
supervised component (GSC). The upper bound on cas-
cade size that is enforced by the GSC, can be lowered by
employing more control devices— i.e., increasing p (see
Fig. 2c). For p ≥ 1 − pc, most nodes are connected by
supervised edges and cascades cannot disconnect nodes
from the giant component.
Whilst q = 1, the only impact of decreasing µ is to
increase the number of devices disconnected by the initial
external shock. Disregarding the correlation induced by
starting the cascade at the point of disconnection, this
effect corresponds to a small shift
δ ∼ 〈s〉 /N, (4)
in the positive x-direction of Figs. 2b and 2c. Here, 〈s〉
is the average sub-tree size associated with a randomly
chosen node (see Fig. 2c inset). Figure 2d shows the
effects of this shift when p > p∗, for both large and small
ε. Here, it is natural to characterize changes in µ by a
normalized cost
C = L(µ)/L(1), (5)
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FIG. 2: The effects of reliable control devices (q = 1). a: The probability that, following a cascade, the remaining
largest connected component of the underlying grid contains more than half of the nodes P1/2, is dependent on the average
load carried by the system l, and the number of control devices present p. For each value of p, the system is characterized by a
critical average load l1/2. Below this critical value, cascades never disconnect more than half of the system (P1/2 = 1), whilst
above it, there is always a finite chance that this will happen (P1/2 < 1). b: As the bond-percolation threshold p
∗ = pc ∼ 0.33
is approached, the critical value l1/2 rises sharply to one due to the formation of a giant supervised component (GSC). Inset:
Results are unchanged by increases in system size. c: The bound on cascade size can be lowered by increasing p > pc and
therefore the size of the GSC. For p ≥ 1 − pc most nodes are connected by supervised edges and therefore cascades cannot
disconnect any nodes completely. Inset: For values of the cost (estimated as the total length of the supervisory network) above
C ∼ 1/2 the average sub-tree size 〈s〉 of the control network— and therefore the average number of devices disconnected at
cascade initiation— is less than 1 and negligible as a fraction of the system size. d: Critical value lε for p > p
∗. In this case,
increasing the cost of the supervisory network only increases the critical load associated with bounding small cascades, and not
those of the order of the system size.
 
FIG. 3: The effects of control device failure (q 6= 1) when every device is connected directly to the CPU
(µ = 1). a: As the reliability of the control devices decreases, more devices are needed to maintain the same critical load. b:
Agreement between the numerical value pmid obtained for the l1/2 transition— and the theoretical form pcq
−α motivated by
simple arguments (see main text and Methods Section).
4where L(µ) is the total length of the supervisory network.
The message of Fig. 2d is that: increasing the number
of direct CPU connections at the cost of increased net-
work length, is only beneficial if the suppression of small
cascades is desired.
If, in contrast to above, the control devices have an
inherent rate-of-failure (q < 1), then a GSC may be either
disconnected or reduced in size as control devices fail. In
the best case scenario, when the supervising network is
mono-centric and q is close to one, the picture is one of
‘effective percolation’ with (see Methods)
p∗ = pcq−α, (6)
where α is determined by the topology of the underlying
network (∼ 2.4 for a Delaunay triangulation, see Meth-
ods section for details). This simple form shows good
agreement with direct estimates of the value of p∗ (see
Fig. 3b and Methods for details). For lower values of q,
percolation-like descriptions are no longer appropriate:
regardless of the number of control devices, it is not pos-
sible to bound cascade sizes in a way that is independent
of the average load carried by the system. Indeed, if con-
trol devices are both unreliable (q < 1) and the control
network is tree-like (µ < 1), the system is very suscep-
tible to large failure cascades, with little impact made
by increasing p (see Fig. 4). In this case, we see that
for both large and small cascades, the topology of the
control network is very relevant and can induce extreme
fragility in the control system (see Fig. 5).
Discussion
In conclusion, we have introduced a minimal model
which incorporates the salient features of many real-
world control systems. Firstly, the control devices are
simple: they only have so-called ‘supervisory’ functions
of monitoring and intervention. Secondly, the system is
‘distributed’, that is, not only are the devices positioned
in space but they require coordination— in this case, by
connection to a CPU. Thirdly, we also incorporate the ef-
fects of devices having an inherent rate-of-failure. With
only these simple characteristics, the resulting behaviour
is very rich. The primary feature concerns the fragility of
such control systems: a small reduction of control device
reliability leads to a regime where the ability to suppress
cascades is dramatically affected by the topology of the
control network. Our results suggest that it is much more
cost-effective to try to improve the reliability of control
devices rather than working on the stability of the su-
pervisory control network. We believe that these results
make a first step in understanding distributed supervi-
sory control, whilst also providing helpful guidelines to
designers and administrators of real systems. We wel-
come further work in the area.
〈n〉 Var [n]
q = 0.95, p = 0.4 2.36 0.0004
q = 0.9, p = 0.45 2.40 0.0007
q = 0.85, p = 0.5 2.40 0.001
q = 0.8, p = 0.6 2.44 0.001
TABLE I: For different values of p and q, 〈n〉 ∼ 2.4, and
Var [n] 〈n〉.
Methods
Simulations
To simulate the system, N nodes are placed in the
plane at random, the Delaunay triangulation is then
formed, and loads are allocated to the resulting edges
according to U(l¯). The supervisory network is incorpo-
rated by first adding a control device to each edge with
probability p, then forming the network according to the
rewiring procedure described in the main text (depen-
dent on parameter µ). Cascades are initiated by assum-
ing an external event that causes an edge to be removed
at random and its load is redistributed amongst its near-
est neighbors. If the failing edge was supervised, then
the control device is also removed. During the ensuing
cascade, we stipulate that for a control device to work, it
must be connected to the CPU, a special node that can-
not be removed. If a control device is unconnected, then
it cannot work and is of no use. However, if a control
device is connected, and it is supervising an edge that is
about to fail— i.e., it is carrying the largest excess load
in the system— then there is a probability q that the
excess load is dissipated and the load of the edge is reset
to l¯. The quantity q can be thought of as the inherent
reliability of a device.
Simulations were written in C++ and implemented us-
ing the Boost Graph library [27] where possible. Delau-
nay triangulations were produced using an iterative al-
gorithm [25].
Results are presented for systems of size N = 500 (∼
3 × 103 edges) and statistics are calculated over 5 × 103
instances of each ensemble (defined by parameters p, q,
µ, and l). Critical values lε and p
∗ are accurate up to
an error of approximately ±0.02, since they are identified
by varying the underlying parameter by finite increments.
In Figs. 4c and 5, lε corresponds to Pε > 0.99 in order to
accommodate the noise associated with different control
network structures.
Formation of an effective GSC
Labelling each supervised edge by i = 1, 2, . . . , Es,
the probability that a supervised edge survives a cas-
cade is qni , where ni is the number of times a device is
solicited— i.e., it tries to dissipate its excess load with
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FIG. 4: The effect of µ (p = 0.5, q = 0.9). When the supervising network is almost mono-centric (µ = 0.9) very few
control devices fail and therefore the remaining largest connected component connects 85% of the nodes in the system. If
the supervising network is almost a tree (µ = 0.1) then even though the inherent failure rate is low, many devices become
disconnected from the CPU and therefore only 10% of nodes are left connected following a cascade.
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FIG. 5: The effect of topology in control networks with unreliable devices (q = 0.9). For all cascade sizes (ie.
regardless of ε), the critical load depends strongly the structure of the supervisory network, in contrast with the completely
reliable case. In particular, even when there are already many direct-CPU links (C > 1/2), the critical load that the system
can carry is drastically reduced by introducing more dependency into the supervisory network.
6probability q. Here, for large enough systems the number
of supervised edges is given by Es = pE. (Since the aver-
age degree of a Delaunay triangulation is peaked around
six, the total number of edges E is well approximated
by E ∼ 3N .) Using a bar to denote system average
qn = 1/Es
∑
i q
ni , we know that if Var [n] is small, then
qn ∼ qn. Approximating a large system average with an
ensemble average 〈. . . 〉 over many smaller systems, the
results are given in Table 1. Here it is clear that the
average 〈n〉 is well approximated by the value 2.4, re-
gardless of p and q, and that the variance is always very
small compared to the average. We can then write the
effective probability that a generic edge resists failure as
peff = p · qα, (7)
with α = 〈n〉 ' 2.4. The system will then be resilient if
peff = pc, which implies Eq. (6).
Equation (6) may be contrasted with a direct approxi-
mation of when an effective GSC forms. From simulation
results, we associate each transition with the value pmid,
defined as halfway between pc and the lowest value of p
for which lε is maximal (i.e., the midpoint of the transi-
tion).
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